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NOTES AND COMMENT
its effect as thus interpreted. It is difficult to understand how the
decision in the Epstein case, wherein the assignee was plaintiff, could
be regarded as a basis upon which to rest the proposition that the ven-
dor is to be permitted to sue the assignee of the vendee. Nevertheless,
there remained considerable doubt that the earlier application of the
mutuality doctrine was to be dispensed with so easily. Now that it
was held that the assignee could sue for specific performance, it was
contended, that since equity is equality the converse ought to be
true. Reciprocity ought to be permitted. The Appellate Division
held, therefore, that the vendor could compel specific performance
against the vendee's assignee." Upon reaching the Court of Appeals
this erroneous conception was corrected and the third party denied
performance against the assignee.' 2 It was pointed out that the
question in the Epstein case was wholly one of remedy rather than
right, and the extent of the holding in that case was that mutuality of
remedy is important only so far as its presence is necessary to attain
the ends of justice. No new rights were created by the Epstein
decision, the interpretation of the assignment of a contract still re-
mains that an assignee does not assume the duties under an assigned
contract, but only succeeds to the rights thereunder. Because it was
adjudicated that no injustice is done if the assignee enforces his
rights, did not mean the burdening of him with duties not assumed,
and the creation of a new right in the vendor. Equity follows the
law and specific performance is a remedy predicated only upon the
existence of a legal right.13
E. P.W.
DAMAGES OR RENT?-Landlords early found it necessary to
provide some means of securing unto themselves the profit of their
position. The lease which evidences the agreement with the tenant
is, as such, merely an agreement for the use of the premises. Out of
that use a rent issues ' and so a priori when the use is terminated no
further rent can accrue. Even though the tenant has broken a con-
dition of his tenancy, for example, the payment of rent, the landlord
if he re-enters and is repossessed of the estate terminates all his rights
under the lease except the right to collect arrears of rent. Therefore,
' H. & H. Corp. v. Broad Holding Corp., 204 App. Div. 569, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 763 (2nd Dept. 1923); Langel v. Betz, 224 App. Div. 266, 229 N. Y.
Supp. 712 (2nd Dept. 1928).
"Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159 (1928).
' Pomeroy's, Specific Performance (3rd ed. 1926) Sec. 52 et seq.
A right to a certain profit (something not before in esse whether in labor,
provisions or part of annual product, money, or other thing) issuing annually
or periodically out of lands and tenements corporeal in return for land that
passes-Gilbert, Rents, 9.
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in an attempt to prevent a failure of profit as a result of such breach
by the tenant, contracts are used to give the transaction stability. Any
liability of the tenant after his ejectment or dispossession for non-
payment of rent or other breach must rest then on these contracts or
covenants 2 (contained usually in the lease instrument) looking to
this very contingency.
How many times landlords by carelessly drawn instruments have
failed to eliminate risk would be difficult to say. The case of Hermi-
tage Company v. Levine 3 shows the practical need of a careful
draftsman.
The Hermitage Company entered into a written lease with
Levine for the use of a seven-story building. The lease was for
twenty-one years and two months from August 1, 1924 at a rental of
$72,000 a year for the first five years, $75,000 for the next ten,
$78,000 for the next three and $80,000 for the last three years of the
term in addition to which the defendant was required to pay taxes,
water rates and assessments which might become liens on the property
during the term of the lease.
The defendant went into possession on August first, nineteen
twenty-four and paid the stipulated rent to and including November
first, nineteen twenty-four. On December first $6,000 became due
for rent for December and some $7,000 for current taxes. Upon
defendant's default in the payment of any part of these sums, sum-
mary proceedings were instituted 4 and an order of dispossess issued
on December 31, 1924.
Plaintiff, upon resuming possession, made diligent efforts to
relet. Three floors it relet to one tenant, two to a second and a
part of one floor to a third. For a few months it ran a garage on the
remaining part of the first floor, but later relet this also. By August
1, 1925 it had relet the whole building. The new leases were for
varying terms. Three and a half floors were relet for fifteen years;
two and a half for ten years; and one for three years. After all are
at an end, a substantial period will remain before October 1, 1945,
when the defendant's liability expires.
The action begun in March, 1926 was brought to recover the
damages suffered by the landlord through the deficiency of rents
computed to that time. The defendant was credited with $30,000, a
security deposit, and with the profits earned through the use of *the
garage as well as with the rents collected. The result was a de-
ficiency of $25,529.39 for which judgment was demanded.
The liability of the tenant to the landlord after the termination
of the tenant's use of the premises and upon which liability the action
was brought sprang from the covenant in the lease:
2 Hall v. Gould, 13 N. Y. 127, 134 (1855).
1222 App. Div. 12 (1st Dept. 1927), rev'd, 248 N. Y. 333, 162 N. E. 97
(1928).
1 C. P. A., Sec. 1410.
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"To pay the rent as herein specified. If any rent shall be
due and unpaid or if the tenant shall make default in any of
the covenants herein contained, it shall be lawful for the
landlord to re-enter the said premises by force or process of
law or otherwise and the same have again, re-possess and
enjoy. In case the tenant shall be dispossessed or ejected or
shall remove from or abandon the demised premises after a
demand for the rent or service of a notice as provided by
Section 1410 of the Civil Practice Act or after the commence-
ment of dispossess proceedings or for any other reason, the
landlord may re-enter the said premises by force or process of
law or otherwise and relet the same as agent for the tenant
and the tenant shall remain liable for all damages which the
landlord may sustain by any such breach of this agreement or
through such entry or reletting."
It is to be noted that the landlord under the first clause in this
covenant reserves to himself the right to re-enter the premises "by
force or process of law or otherwise and the same, have again,
re-possess and enjoy." This is a usual provision in a present-day
lease but the necessity for so providing was brought out by the inter-
pretations which the court placed on the language of covenants pre-
viously drawn. For example, in the decision of Michaels v. Fishel 5
it was said that a provision permitting the landlord to re-enter
referred solely to a re-entry by ejectment and so the tenant was dis-
charged from his liability for deficiency of rent upon reletting because
the landlord re-possessed himself by summary proceedings. An ex-
tensive and intelligent revision of leases followed. The moral which
landlords drew was that the language of leases should be made
broader by reserving a right additionally to re-enter and dispossess
the tenant pursuant to summary proceedings under the statute or, as
in the case of Anzolone v. Paskusz,0 a right "to re-enter by force
or otherwise."
In addition to its right to re-enter in any manner, the Hermitage
Company reserved its right to relet the premises as agent for the
defendant. Judge Cardozo in his opinion in Kottler v. New York
Bargain House, Inc.,7 points out that a type of covenant which gives
the landlord merely the privilege of re-entering the premises to have
again, repossess and enjoy the same by its very terms goes no further.
The landlord in such a case would have no authority to relet for the
account of the lessee and no deficiency could be chargeable to him.
In other words, summary dispossession under the statute terminates
the tenant's liability to pay subsequently accruing rent 8 unless a sur-
0169 N. Y. 381, 62 N. E. 425 (1902).
'96 App. Div. 188, 193, 89 N. Y. Supp. 203, 206 (1st Dept. 1904).
(Italics ours.)
7242 N. Y. 28, 34, 150 N. E. 591, 592 (1904).
SChaude v. Shepard, 122 N. Y. 397, 25 N. E. 358 (1890); Cornwell v.
Sanford, 222 N. Y. 248, 118 N. E. 620 (1918).
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viving obligation is imposed by a covenant of personal responsibility
"to pay rent or indemnify the landlord for future loss." 9
Another point worth noting in this clause, permitting a reletting,
is that it provides this privilege whether the tenant has been dis-
possessed, ejected or has abandoned the premises. New York Courts
have held that, where a landlord relets after the tenant's abandonment,
consent on the part of the abandoning tenant to the making of this
new lease must be shown, otherwise the new lease made by the land-
lord is a surrender of his rights against the original tenant.10 Such
consent or acquiescence will not be implied by the silence of a tenant
after his abandonment upon the receipt of a letter from the landlord
suggesting that he intends to relet as the tenant's agent,1 though such
consent would be spelled out from a conversation regarding reletting
in which the tenant made no objection.12
It is hard to see why the landlord should be prevented from
asserting the old lease merely because he has tried to reduce the
tenant's obligation thereunder. The tenant having repudiated his
obligations should not be allowed to assert his non-consent to reletting.
However, the New York rule is otherwise. The landlord may in the
case of an abandonment remain inactive and hold the tenant for his
li4bility under a continuing lease. In order for him to claim then
that he made a new lease on behalf of the tenant to mitigate
damages 13 it must be shown to have been with the tenant's consent.
In the Hermitage case the landlord has safeguarded himself
against this difficulty by securing such consent in advance.
However, the reletting of the premises did not come as the result
of the tenant's abandonment but as the result of his dispossession for
non-payment of rent. In such a case a landlord, it is sometimes said,
must use reasonable diligence to relet where in pursuance of the lease
he is authorized so to do.14 This the Hermitage Company did and
so there is thus far then no valid defense to its action against the
defendant. If there be one it must be founded on some other ground
of non-liability at the time of the action.
The last clause of the lease provides that upon reletting "the
tenant shall remain liable for all danmges which the landlord may
sustain by any such breach of this agreement or through such entry
or reletting." (Italics ours.)
The defendant claimed that a proper interpretation of this clause
made the action in 1926 premature, that after he was ejected in
'Supra Note 8.
" Coe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y. 141, 145 (1878). Surrender is implied and so
effected by operation of law within statute when another estate is created by
reversioner or remainderman incompatible with existing state or term.
'Gray v. Kaufman Dairy and Ice Cream Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 56 N. E.
903 (1900).
"Underhill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 30 N. E. 576 (1892).
'In re Hevenor, 144 N. Y. 271, 39 N. E. 393 (1895); 3 Williston, Con-
tracts (1920), Sec. 1403.
" Knabe & Co. Mfg. Co. v. Dinwiddie, 116 N. Y. Supp. 716 (1909).
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summary proceedings the lease was at an end and what survived was
a liability for damages not rent, the ascertainment of which damages
would not be possible until October 1, 1945. The plaintiff insisted
that by proper construction of this covenant the loss was to be deter-
mined monthly as if the lease were still in force with the result that
successive causes of action will arise with monthly deficits in rental.
It is not denied that by a properly drawn contract the parties
could have effected a survival of the obligation to pay the rent
reserved following dispossess 15 in which case the reletting would
have been a reletting by the landlord as agent of the tenant 16 with
his permission during the continuance of the term of the lease to
mitigate damages arising thereunder and if so provided to pay over
any surplus to the tenant.
Such a lease is found in the Kottler case,1" which provides that
"if said premises or any part thereof shall become vacant during the
term the landlord or his representatives may re-enter the same, either
by force or otherwise without being liable to prosecution therefor;
and relet said premises as agent of said tenant and receive rent
thereof applying the same, first to the payment of such expenses as
they may be put to in re-entering and then to the payment of rent
due by these presents; balance if any to be paid over to the tenant
who shall remain liable for any deficiency." The lease in this case
was to run until 1925 and the action was begun in 1924, among other
things for a deficiency as a result of reletting following abandon-
ment. The defendant argued that the action in so far as it included
a claim for deficiency upon reletting was premature when begun in
1924 for the liability was for damages which could not be known
until 1925 when the lease was to have expired by its terms.
The Court, however, said: 18
"We think the claim is *** for rent. There is a dis-
tinction between A reletting by a landlord after the expira-
tion of a term, and a reletting as agent for the tenant during
the existence of the term. In the one case, the tenant, even
though chargeable by force of a covenant with a subsequent
deficiency, is liable for damages. The term is at an end. In
the other, he is liable for rent, what is received through a
reletting being merely a payment on account. The term is
still in being. The covenant in this lease does not say that the
tenant is to be chargeable with a deficiency after the lease
shall be terminated for re-entry for condition broken. It
M Mann v. Ferdinand Munch Brevery, 225 N. Y. 189, 121 N. E. 746 (1919)
rev'g, 173 App. Div. 746, 160 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dept. 1916); Baylies v.
Ingram, 181 N. Y. 518, 73 N. E. 1119 (1905).
"Supra Note 12.
"Supra Note 7.
SIbid. 33.
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covers a single situation. If the premises be vacant 'during the
term,' the landlord is empowered to re-enter and relet." "9
In so doing the landlord does not forfeit or put an end to the existence
of the term and the lessee is liable for a deficiency of rental. The
term remains alive.
A lease similar in effect is found in the case of Mann v. Munch
Brewery Company.20  "If the tenant is dispossessed by issuance of
service of any warrant or final order in summary proceedings or if he
abandon the premises he shall nevertheless continue liable for payment
of rent and the performance of all other conditions contained therein.
The tenant shall not be relieved from liability for payment of rent
by any assignment which may be made of this lease whether with or
without the consent of the landlord but each and every assignee and
assignor of this lease shall continue to remain liable for payment of
rent and the performance of other covenants and conditions until the
expiration of the term thereof." The assignee in this case having
assumed the covenants of the lease was held liable therefor for
monthly rental, collectible as it accrued.
To return to the case under consideration, the Hermitage Com-
pany's contention was that the interpretation of the above-mentioned
leases was the one which should be placed on its lease, that is, that
the rent obligation survived dispossession and reletting and hence for
rental deficiencies it could collect. Its contention was sustained by
the prevailing opinion of the Appellate Division.2 '
"It is our view, from the nature of the terms of the
clause in question, that it was not intended to cover damages at
the end of a long term for breach of the covenant to pay rent,
but was intended to give an immediate right of action for
deficiency of rentals from the amount provided in the lease,
whenever that deficiency arose. This is apparent to us from
the phrase 'damages * * * through such entry or reletting' at
the end of the clause which points to a loss of rental as 'such'
damages to be recovered under the lease and intended to
survive eviction, abandonment or dispossession of the tenant.
'Each covenant must be taken as we find it.'"
From this opinion, Judge O'Malley dissenting said: 22
"Unquestionably if the covenant in question is one where-
'by the obligation to pay rent survives the termination of the
"Fleisher v. Friob, 177 App. Div. 921, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1092 (1st Dept.
1917) ; Chaude v. Shepard, supra Note 8.
-Mann v. Ferdinand Munch Brewery, supra Note 15. (Italics ours.)
'
tSupra Note 3, 222 App. Div. at 13 (Opinion by McAvoy, J., Merrell
and Finch, II., concurring).
Ibid. 16 (Dowling, P. J., concurred).
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lease the plaintiff's position is sound. On the other hand, if
the covenant is a provision for damages strictly as such, the
action may not now be maintained. * * * I am of the opinion
that the covenant here under consideration is one for damages.
The covenant itself mentions only 'damages.' It contains no
provision to the effect that the obligation to pay rent should
survive the term; nor does it provide that the tenant was to be
liable for any deficiency resulting from a reletting. Neither
does it provide that any surplus from a reletting was to be
payable to the tenant."
On appeal by the defendant, judge Cardozo writing for a unani-
mous court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. The
question, he said, was one of the intention of the parties. While the
lease in all cases is terminated by the eviction under summary pro-
ceedings, "in the case where the covenant provides for damages the
term of the lease is also ended" and where the term is so ended the
reletting by the landlord as agent for the tenant does not mean "that
he is agent in a strict sense. Plainly he is not, for after the termina-
tion of the lease, what he relets is his own. The privilege to relet as
agent for the former tenant means this and nothing more that the
reletting shall be evidence of the damages sustained. * * * The dam-
ages when the time to ascertain them comes will be computed upon
the basis of what is realized through the reletting without other
evidence of value."
The defendant was liable.for damages then but the question still
remained how were they to be computed. "Is there to be a single
cause of action in which all the damages will be computed down to
October, 1945, or are there to be monthly causes of action to recover
successive deficits, though conceivably new leases made when the
present ones are over will make the net result a surplus ?"
The clause in McCready v. Lindenborn 23 made monthly causes
of action for damages a possibility. The parties after providing for
reletting upon default covenanted, "as damages for breach of cove-
nant for rent herein the difference between the amount of rent hereby
reserved and the amount which shall be collected and received or
might with due diligence be collected and received during the residue
of the term remaining unexpired at or immediately before tle time
of such re-entry in equal "zonthly payments as the amount of such
shall from time to time be ascertained."
But, as pointed out by Judge Cardozo, "in the absence of a
provision that points with reasonable clearness to a different con-
struction a liability for damages resulting from reletting is single and
entire; not multiple and several. The deficiency is to be ascertained
when the term is at an end." For a defendant to be held liable for
'McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208 (1902). (Italics
ours.)
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monthly deficiencies of rental the tenant must plainly remain liable
for rent during his term surviving eviction or, where his term under
the covenant of the lease ceases upon such eviction, clear expression
must show that his damages were to be computed monthly on the
rental loss sustained through reletting, for to hold him to liability in
the latter case is to place upon him a burden possibly heavier than he
sustains for a deficiency at the end of the term. "He must pay in the
lean months without recouping in the fat ones. He must do this
though it may turn out in the end that there has been a gain and not
a loss." But where the damages are computed at the end of the term
his liability is determined by allowing him all sums collected so that
there might be a deficiency. "A liability so heavy may not rest upon
uncertain inference."
Rather evidently by the drafting of this last clause the Hermi-
tage Company failed in its purpose. To quote Judge Cardozo again; 
2 4
"We do not overlook the hardship to the landlord in post-
poning the cause of action until October, 1945. The hardship
is so great as to give force to the argument that postponement
to a date so distant may not reasonably be held to have been
intended by the parties. There is no reason to suppose, how-
ever, that the landlord was expectant of so early a default or
so heavy a deficiency. It had in its possession a deposit of
cash security in the sum of $30,000. Very likely this was
supposed to be enough to make default improbable and the
risk of loss remote. If the damage clause as drawn gives
inadequate protection, the fault is with the draftsman. The
courts are not at liberty to supply its omissions at the expense
of a tenant whose liability for the future ended with the can-
cellation of the lease except in so far as he bound himself by
covenant to liability thereafter."
G. M. B.
VALIDITY OF STATE SUPERVISION OF SECRET SocIETIEs.-A
member of a secret society who was held in custody to answer a
charge of violating a New York statute brought a proceeding in
habeas corpus to obtain his discharge on the ground that the warrant
under which he was arrested and detained was issued without juris-
diction in that the statute, with violation of which he was charged,
was unconstitutional.' The offense alleged was that he attended
"' Supra Note 3, 248 N. Y. at 338.
'People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman.
